

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 290276
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

66011
DRAFTED BY:PM:PATRICKRHAYES
APPROVED BY:S/S:SGOLDSMITH
-----063014 060420Z /61

R 060214Z DEC 77 ZFF5
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0000
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USNATO
USMISSION GENEVA

S E C R E T STATE 290276

NODIS
GENEVA FOR USDEL SALT

FOLLOWING REPEAT BONN 20133 ACTION SECSTATE DEC 5

QUOTE: S E C R E T BONN 20133

NODIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE REPEAT TO USDEL SALT GENEVA, USNATO,
LONDON, PARIS, AND MOSCOW

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM MNUC NATO GW US
SUBJECT: SALT: WARNKE CONSULTATIONS WITH FRG

REFS: (A) BONN 19886; (B) STATE 285699

BEGIN SUMMARY. IN THEIR MEETINGS WITH AMBASSADOR WARNKE
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ON DECEMBER 2, VAN WELL, BLECH AND RUTH FOCUSED THE
DISCUSSIONS ON THE CURRENT STATE OF SALT II NEGOTIATIONS
AND ON THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSULTATIONS ON THE STRUCTURE
OF SALT III. WARNKE FULLY AGREED THAT SUCH
CONSULTATIONS SHOULD BE HELD ON A PRIORITY BASIS,
INASMUCH AS THEY WOULD HAVE A DIRECT BEARING ON THE
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES IN SALT II. WARNKE ALSO
WELCOMED AN FRG PROPOSAL FOR A BILATERAL CONSULTATION
IN THE NEAR FUTURE ON THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROBLEM.

IN REFERRING TO THE FRG PROPOSAL FOR QUADRIPARTITE CONSULTATIONS, VAN WELL STRESSED THAT THE FRG HAD NO DESIRE TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE US. RATHER, THE PROPOSAL HAD BEEN A RESULT OF THE CHANCELLOR'S DIRECT INTEREST IN MORE INTENSIVE DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES, NOW THAT SALT WAS APPROACHING A POINT WHERE THE INTERESTS OF THE EUROPEANS WERE MORE DIRECTLY INVOLVED.

WE BELIEVE AMBASSADOR WARNKE'S VISIT HERE WAS HIGHLY USEFUL AND HAS DONE MUCH TO ASSUAGE FRG CONCERNS.
END SUMMARY.

1. IN AN OPENING 90-MINUTE PLENARY SESSION, AMBASSADOR WARNKE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR EARLE, LT.GEN. ROWNY, LT.GEN. SEIGNIOUS, AND COLONEL CLYNE. FOREIGN OFFICE POLITICAL DIRECTOR KLAUS BLECH, WHO LED THE GERMAN DELEGATION, WAS ACCOMPANIED BY DISARMAMENT COMMISSIONER RUTH AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CHANCELLERY (RANTZAU) AND THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (SCHREIBER). THEREAFTER AMBASSADORS WARNKE AND EARLE MET FOR NEARLY AN HOUR IN A MORE RESTRICTED SESSION WITH STATE SECRETARY (AND ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER) VAN WELL, WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED ONLY BY BLECH.

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2. IN THE PLENARY SESSION, WARNKE DESCRIBED THE PROGRESS IN SALT NEGOTIATIONS SINCE GROMYKO'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. REPEATING ESSENTIALLY THE BRIEFING GIVEN TO THE NAC EARLIER IN THE DAY, HE OUTLINED THE ISSUES ON WHICH AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED AND DESCRIBED THE PROBLEMS YET TO BE RESOLVED.

3. TOPICS ON WHICH DISCUSSION WAS FOCUSED FOLLOWING THE BRIEFING IN THE PLENARY SESSION AND IN THE SUBSEQUENT MEETING WITH VAN WELL ARE SUMMARIZED BELOW.

TIMETABLE FOR NEGOTIATIONS

4. BLECH REFERRED TO THE CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF UNRESOLVED ISSUES AND ASKED WHETHER IT WAS POSSIBLE TO MAKE A ROUGH ESTIMATE ON TIMING. WARNKE REPLIED THAT HE HAD BEEN ASKED THE SAME QUESTION EARLIER IN THE WEEK BY THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE AND HAD HAZARDED A PREDICTION OF MARCH 1978 FOR CONCLUSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THEREAFTER, CONSIDERABLE TIME WOULD BE REQUIRED TO PREPARE THE ENTIRE PACKAGE FOR SUBMISSION TO THE SENATE, AND THIS MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE BEFORE MAY OR JUNE. BECAUSE IT WOULD BE AN ELECTION YEAR, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO GUESS WHEN THE SENATE WOULD BEGIN RATIFICATION HEARINGS.

RATIFICATION PROSPECTS

5. BOTH BLECH AND SUBSEQUENTLY VAN WELL PROBED FOR ADMINISTRATION VIEWS ON POSSIBLE DIFFICULTIES IN OBTAINING RATIFICATION. WARNKE EXPRESSED OPTIMISM, NOTING THAT THE SENATE WOULD NOT BE COMPARING SALT II AGAINST AN IDEAL ARMS CONTROL ARRANGEMENT BUT AGAINST THE ALTERNATIVE TO SALT II -- WHICH WOULD BE NO NEW AGREEMENT AT ALL AND THE LIKELY PROSPECT OF CONTINUED SECRET

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SOVIET BUILD-UP OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS. HE THOUGHT THE SENATE WOULD REALIZE THAT SALT II WOULD REPRESENT AN EFFECTIVE STEP FORWARD, IN THAT IT WOULD RESTRICT FUTURE DEPLOYMENT AND INDEED REQUIRE DESTRUCTION OF SOME EXISTING SOVIET WEAPONS.

FRG INTEREST IN CONSULTATIONS

6. AFTER EXPRESSING APPRECIATION TO AMBASSADOR WARNKE FOR HIS VISIT TO BONN, VAN WELL SAID HE THOUGHT THE US UNDERSTOOD THE MOTIVES FOR THE FRG INTEREST IN MORE INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS. THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE NOW GOING IN A DIRECTION OF PARTICULAR RELEVANCE FOR EUROPE AND THE ISSUES SHOULD BE DISCUSSED MORE INTENSIVELY. HE STRESSED THAT THE GERMANS WERE NOT TRYING TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE US BUT EXPLAINED THAT SALT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE FEDERAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND THAT THE CHANCELLOR HAD INSTRUCTED THE FOREIGN OFFICE TO LOOK INTO THE ISSUES ON AN URGENT BASIS. REFERRING TO THE QUADRIPARTITE CONSULTATIONS SCHEDULED FOR DECEMBER 7, VAN WELL NOTED THAT THE FRENCH HAD NOT YET BEEN HEARD FROM AND THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THEY NOT GET TOO UPSET. THEY HAD A PERENNIAL FEAR OF BEING "DRAWN IN" TO THINGS, BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THEY PARTICIPATED.

7. WARNKE FULLY AGREED, NOTING THAT WE HAD NOW REACHED A POINT WHERE WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS ADVANCE PREPARATION, NOT JUST CONSULTATIONS. THE QUESTION OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES NOW HAD TO BE CONSIDERED, AS FUTURE NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL MEASURES MIGHT NO LONGER DEAL ONLY WITH INTERCONTINENTAL FORCES.

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8. VAN WELL STATED THAT SUCH PREPARATIONS AND CONSULTATIONS WERE ALSO IMPORTANT IN ORDER TO AVOID WHAT MIGHT BE A CONFUSED PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF STRATEGIC ISSUES. HE NOTED THE TRADITION IN THE FRG FOR CONDUCTING DEBATE ON SUCH ISSUES ON A BIPARTISAN BASIS

AND THE DETERMINATION OF THE GOVERNMENT TO CONTINUE THIS TRADITION. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO KEPT THE OPPOSITION INFORMED AND IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THIS CONTINUE IF AN INTENSE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE IS TO BE AVOIDED. HE NOTED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT THE RECENT PARTY CONGRESSES OF THE TWO COALITION PARTIES HAD ACTED RESPONSIBLY WITHOUT TOO MUCH PREJUDGING OF THE ISSUES.

ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPONS

9. VAN WELL SAID THAT, AS HE HAD TOLD P/M DIRECTOR GELB, THE FRG WOULD LIKE THE ERW TO BE A CREDIBLE OPTION, SO THAT IF THERE WERE NO RESULTS FROM NEGOTIATIONS IT COULD ALSO BE USED AS DETERRENCE. THE FRG COULD NOT YET MAKE A DECISION ON THE ERW, AS OPINION MUST BE PREPARED FOR IT. NEVERTHELESS, THE DEBATE HAD BECOME STABILIZED AND THE SPD AND FDP PARTY CONGRESSES HAD NOT RULED OUT A DECISION FOR DEPLOYMENT. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM WARNKE, VAN WELL SAID HE DID NOT THINK THAT -- EVEN IF ER BECAME A MATTER OF FUTURE INTENSE PUBLIC DEBATE -- THERE WOULD BE ANY SPILLOVER EFFECT ON THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES GENERALLY. HE NOTED THAT EARLIER REFERENCES TO A POSSIBILITY OF REDUCING THE NUMBER OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARHEADS HAD NOT BEEN A CAUSE FOR JUBILATION IN THE FRG.

RELATIONSHIP OF THE PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY

10. RUTH EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING OF THE US POSITION, AS IT HAD BEEN EXPLAINED BY P/M DIRECTOR GELB, THAT THE PROTOCOL WOULD BE IN EFFECT FOR THREE YEARS ONLY AND THAT
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THE US WOULD KEEP OPEN NOT ONLY ALL TECHNICAL OPTIONS BUT ALSO ALL POLITICAL OPTIONS. HE ASKED, HOWEVER, FOR FULLER INFORMATION ON US THINKING AS TO HOW THE ISSUES DEALT WITH IN THE PROTOCOL WOULD INTER-RELATE WITH SALT III NEGOTIATIONS. WARNKE STRESSED THAT THE PROTOCOL HAD BEEN A US PROPOSAL AND HAD BEEN SPECIFICALLY DEvised AS A MEANS OF HOLDING OPTIONS OPEN. HE NOTED THAT, AS WOULD BE STATED IN THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, THE ISSUES IN THE PROTOCOL WOULD BE AMONG THOSE DEALT WITH IN SALT III.

11. ASKED TO CLARIFY THE TIMING OF THE TWO DOCUMENTS, EARLE SAID THE SALT II TREATY WAS PLANNED TO RUN THROUGH DECEMBER 1985, WHILE THE PROTOCOL UNDER THE US PROPOSAL WOULD EXPIRE OCTOBER 2, 1980 (THE SOVIETS HAD PROPOSED THAT THE THREE YEAR PROTOCOL PERIOD COMMENCE WITH THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF SALT II). RUTH AND BLECH EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN HOW THE PROTOCOL RESTRICTIONS WOULD BE TREATED DURING THE PERIOD BETWEEN

1980 AND 1985, WHEN THE ISSUES IN THE PROTOCOL WOULD BE UNDER NEGOTIATION AS A PART OF SALT III. RUTH SAID HE HAD NO DIFFICULTY IN ACCEPTING THE POLITICAL DETERMINATION OF THE US TO KEEP OPTIONS OPEN, BUT HE POINTED OUT THAT IT WOULD BE ARGUED DOMESTICALLY IN EUROPE -- AND ALSO IN THE US -- THAT THE AGREEMENTS IN THE PROTOCOL WOULD HAVE TO BE CONTINUED. WARNKE RESPONDED THAT THE PROTOCOL WOULD NOT BECOME A PRECEDENT UNLESS ONE CHOSE TO FOLLOW IT. HE REITERATED THAT THE US HAD MADE IT CLEAR FROM THE BEGINNING THAT THE PROTOCOL WAS SIMPLY A HOLD-THE-LINE DOCUMENT AND THAT IT WOULD NOT BE BINDING AFTER THREE YEARS.

12. IN A VARIATION OF THE SAME QUESTION, BLECH SAID HE
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COULD ENVISAGE A SITUATION IN WHICH THE PROTOCOL HAD NOT YET EXPIRED, WHILE THE MATTERS IN THE PROTOCOL HAD BEEN DEALT WITH IN NEGOTIATIONS FOR SALT III AND WERE PART OF A DRAFT SALT III TREATY WHICH HAD NOT BEEN COMPLETED IN OTHER PARTS. HE ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN THAT SITUATION UPON THE EXPIRATION OF THE PROTOCOL, AND WHETHER IT WOULD INDEED BE POLITICALLY FEASIBLE TO ALLOW THE PROTOCOL TO EXPIRE. WARNKE RESPONDED THAT IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO CHANGE OUR THINKING ABOUT THE FORM OF SALT III. SALT II WOULD BE A TREATY TO REPLACE AN INTERIM AGREEMENT. IT WOULD SETTLE MANY BASIC ISSUES WHICH WOULD CARRY OVER TO SALT III, AND IT SEEMED LIKELY, THEREFORE, THAT SALT III MIGHT IN FACT REPRESENT A SERIES OF AMENDMENTS TO SALT II, NOT ALL OF WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE PUT INTO EFFECT AT THE SAME TIME. FOR EXAMPLE, AN AGREEMENT ON A FUTURE REDUCTION IN AGGREGATES MIGHT SIMPLY BE FORMALIZED AS AN AMENDMENT TO THE AGGREGATES SECTION OF SALT II. AN AGREEMENT TO EXTEND CERTAIN OF THE PROVISIONS IN THE PROTOCOL MIGHT BE HANDLED IN THE SAME FASHION.

NON-CIRCUMVENTION

13. RUTH SAID THE GERMANS HAD GIVEN CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT TO THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROBLEM BUT HAD NOT YET COME TO ANY FIRM CONCLUSIONS. HE WONDERED WHETHER IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO HAVE A SPECIAL BILATERAL SESSION, POSSIBLY IN GENEVA, ON THIS ISSUE. WARNKE EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO HOLD SUCH CONSULTATIONS AND INVITED RUTH TO GET IN TOUCH WITH HIM AS SOON AS THE GERMANS WERE READY TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE.

14. VAN WELL ALSO RAISED THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION ISSUE, ASKING WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO LIMIT THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE TO THE SALT II TREATY OR WHETHER IT WOULD ALSO BE IN THE PROTOCOL. WARNKE RESPONDED THAT

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IT WOULD APPLY TO THE PROTOCOL AS WELL, INASMUCH AS IT IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE TREATY. HE POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT DEVELOPMENT OF SEA-LAUNCHED AND GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES WOULD NOT HAVE PROGRESSED FAR ENOUGH DURING THE PROTOCOL PERIOD TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTED.

15. IN DESCRIBING GERMAN CONCERNS ABOUT THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION, VAN WELL REFERRED TO EXPERIENCE WITH THE SOVIETS IN THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL INSTRUMENTS IN THE BERLIN CONTEXT. GIVEN THIS EXPERIENCE, THE FRG WAS CAUTIOUS WHENEVER THE SOVIETS CALLED FOR WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS. BLECH ELABORATED THAT NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF TREATY PROVISIONS WAS A MATTER OF COURSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. WHEN THE SOVIETS INSISTED ON PUTTING IT IN WRITING, ONE MUST EXAMINE IT CAREFULLY TO BE CERTAIN THE CLAUSE WAS NOT CHANGING SOMETHING IT WAS OSTENSIBLY SUPPOSED TO BE ENFORCING. WARNKE REPEATED TO VAN WELL THAT WE WERE SATISFIED WITH OUR NON-CIRCUMVENTION LANGUAGE AND WOULD LOOK FORWARD TO THE CONSULTATIONS ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION WHICH RUTH HAD PROPOSED.

STRUCTURE OF SALT III

16. BLECH SAID THE EUROPEANS WERE TRYING TO COME TO GRIPS INTELLECTUALLY WITH THE QUESTIONS THAT WOULD BE DEALT WITH IN SALT III. IF, AS WARNKE HAD SUGGESTED, SALT III MIGHT IN PART BE IN THE FORM OF AMENDMENTS TO SALT II, THIS PRESUPPOSED THAT IT WOULD CONTINUE TO BE A BILATERAL MATTER. WARNKE REPLIED THAT TWO DIFFERENT NEGOTIATIONS WERE CONCEIVABLE BUT SAID THE QUESTION HAD NOT YET BEEN THOUGHT THROUGH BY THE US.

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THE PROBLEM DESERVED URGENT ATTENTION, AS DECISIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE REACHED ON SUCH QUESTIONS AS WHETHER THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES WOULD BE INCLUDED AND, IF SO, HOW.

17. RUTH NOTED THAT SUCH ISSUES HAD NEVER BEEN DISCUSSED IN NATO AND SUGGESTED THE NEED FOR VERY CONFIDENTIAL, INFORMAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. WARNKE SAID THAT HE AGREED COMPLETELY, AS DID SECRETARY VANCE, AND THAT SUCH DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE HELD ON A PRIORITY BASIS. THEY WOULD AFFECT THE WORDING OF THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES IN SALT II. ONE POSSIBILITY FOR A QUID PRO QUO FOR A LIMITATION ON GLCM'S IN SALT III

WOULD BE THE SS-20; THIS WOULD IMMEDIATELY RAISE THE QUESTION OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES. BLECH REFERRED TO THE NEED FOR REACHING A CLEAR CATEGORIZATION OF ALL THE ITEMS IN THE GRAY ZONE. IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO ASSIGN A VALUE TO EACH AND TO REACH A VIEW ON WHETHER THE INDIVIDUAL ITEMS COULD BE INCLUDED IN SALT III.

18. WHEN VAN WELL RAISED THE SAME ISSUE, WARNKE POINTED OUT THAT THE SECRETARY HAD MADE THE POINT FIRMLY TO GROMYKO BOTH IN MARCH AND IN MAY THAT THERE WOULD BE NO DISCUSSION OF FBS UNTIL THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS SUCH THINGS AS SS-20 AND IRBM'S. HE ADDED THAT IT HAD ALSO BEEN MADE CLEAR TO SEMENOV IN GENEVA THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT THAT SALT III COULD DEAL WITH US NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE BUT NOT WITH SOVIET WEAPONS TARGETED ON EUROPE. VAN WELL EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THIS US POSITION AND HOPED THAT THE POINT COULD ALSO BE REFLECTED IN THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES.

19. WARNKE OBSERVED THAT ACCEPTANCE OF FBS AND SOVIET THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AS INVOLVED IN SALT III WOULD SOLVE SOME PROBLEMS BUT WOULD INTRODUCE OTHERS. SALT
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COULD NO LONGER BE STRICTLY A BILATERAL NEGOTIATION; AT A MINIMUM, THE US WOULD NEED A DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FROM THE ALLIES. VAN WELL AGAIN REFERRED TO THE FRENCH DETERMINATION NOT TO BE "DRAWN IN" TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, THEY WERE OPPOSED TO ANYTHING WHICH WOULD PLACE LIMITATIONS ON THEIR DEFENSE FORCES. HE THEN EXPRESSED THE VIEW -- STRESSING THAT IT WAS PURE SPECULATION ON HIS PART -- THAT THE FINAL OUTCOME OF ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS WOULD BE THAT THE US WOULD CONTINUE TO CONDUCT THE BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS BUT THAT THE BACK-UP WOULD BE MORE STRUCTURED, WITH MORE CONSULTATIONS IN NATO. WHILE THIS WOULD MEAN THE EXCLUSION OF BRITISH AND FRENCH NATIONAL FORCES FROM THE NEGOTIATION -- WHICH WOULD POSE PROBLEMS FOR THE OTHER SIDE -- HE COULD SEE NO OTHER OUTCOME AT THE MOMENT.

20. VAN WELL STATED THAT HIS INTEREST IN USG VIEWS ON THE TIMETABLE FOR SALT NEGOTIATIONS WAS IN PART RELATED TO THE STATE OF FRG-SOVIET RELATIONS. HE STATED THAT THERE WAS NOT MUCH FOUNDATION FOR THE RECURRENT RUMORS ON TIMING FOR A BREZHNEV VISIT TO BONN, BUT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD AN EXCELLENT WAY OF CASTING THE FRG IN THE ROLE OF DEMANDEUR. CURRENT RUMORS THAT BREZHNEV WOULD COME IN FEBRUARY WERE BEING SPREAD BY THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES, ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO BASIS IN FACT. MEANWHILE, PRESSURES WERE CREATED ON THE FRG TO

CONTRIBUTE TO A CLIMATE THAT WOULD MAKE THE VISIT
SUCCESSFUL. THE GERMANS WONDERED, THEREFORE, TO WHAT
EXTENT THIS ACTIVITY WAS LINKED TO US-SOVIET RELATIONS.
IT SEEMED CLEAR THAT BREZHNEV WOULD NOT WANT TO COME TO
BONN UNTIL SUCCESS IN SALT WAS ASSURED. VAN WELL ADDED
THAT THE GERMANS WERE INTERESTED IN GOOD RELATIONS WITH
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THE USSR AND WERE RACKING THEIR BRAINS FOR SOMETHING
THAT COULD MAKE THE BREZHNEV VISIT A SUCCESS. MUCH
DEPENDENT, HOWEVER, ON THE STATE OF US-SOVIET
RELATIONS.

21. THE FOREGOING HAS BEEN CLEARED BY AMBASSADOR WARNKE.

22. COMMENT: IN EMBASSY VIEW, THE VISIT WAS HIGHLY
USEFUL AND HAS DONE MUCH TO ASSUAGE THE FRG CONCERNS
WHICH HAVE BEEN BUBBLING FOR SOME TIME. VAN WELL WAS
OBVIOUSLY REASSURED BY WARNKE'S STRESS ON US DESIRE TO
CONSULT FULLY ON THE ISSUES THAT LIE AHEAD. THE VISIT
HAS HELPED SUSTAIN THE FRG DISPOSITION TO WORK OPENLY
AND CLOSELY WITH US ON THIS MATTER IN THE FUTURE.
STOESSEL UNQUOTE VANCE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 22-Sep-1999 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: CAT-B, MEETING REPORTS, MEETINGS, SALT (ARMS CONTROL), NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 06-Dec-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE290276
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter:
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 XGDS-3
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: N770008-0600
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t197712111/baaaeuoo.tel
Line Count: 407
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Message ID: f2f35dfc-c188-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 04-Apr-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 119173
Secure: LOCK1
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SALT: WARNKE CONSULTATIONS WITH FRG
TAGS: PARM, MNUC, GE, US, NATO
To: n/a INFO RUDTC LONDON MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/f2f35dfc-c188-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009